Empirical reality, empirical causality, and the measurement problem

Foundations of Physics 17 (5):507-529 (1987)
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Abstract

Does physics describe anything that can meaningfully be called “independent reality,” or is it merely operational? Most physicists implicitly favor an intermediate standpoint, which takes quantum physics into account, but which nevertheless strongly holds fast to quite strictly realistic ideas about apparently “obvious facts” concerning the macro-objects. Part 1 of this article, which is a survey of recent measurement theories, shows that, when made explicit, the standpoint in question cannot be upheld. Part 2 brings forward a proposal for making minimal changes to this standpoint in such a way as to remove such objections. The “empirical reality” thus constructed is a notion that, to some extent,does ultimately refer to the human means of apprehension and of data processing. It nevertheless cannot be said that it reduces to a mere name just labelling a “set of recipes that never fail.” It is shown that our usual notion of macroscopic causality must be endowed with similar features

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