Abstract

How should we respond to political ambivalence when conflicting avenues for political action arise? Some theories of justice, such as objective theories, tell us to follow whatever norms realize a set of independently determined objective goods. I argue such theories are incomplete because they specify political goods to aim at, but do not specify which norms to follow, and thus yield an ineliminable ambivalence. Through analysis of a series of significant obstacles, I show that the objective goods that theorists defend are multiply realizable and thus that different sets of mutually exclusive norms could successfully bring about such goods. I call this set of obstacles “ambivalence” in objective theories of political norms because we must choose between multiple conflicting would-be norms, each of which is compatible with the theory. Objective theories cannot provide direction on these choices and so international norms of justice raise a question about which ambivalence could be appropriate. How should we solve this ambivalence problem? I consider a range of competing alternatives that could complete objective accounts and show that consent through social contract theory presents the best available alternative. I conclude that avoiding political ambivalence on objective global political norms necessitates a consent-based constructivist element.