Sources of Domain-Independence in the Formal Sciences

Abstract

Any discussion of the concept of “formal science” must acknowledge that the term is used in different ways, for different purposes, by different people. For some, the formal sciences are defined by the exclusive use of deductive methods for discovering, or reasoning about, the properties of formal, abstract systems. On this view, the formal sciences are synonymous with mathematics, formal logic, and certain branches of linguistics and computer science that emphasize the study of formal languages. For others, “formal science” means something like “exact science”, or “formalized science”. On this view, any scientific discipline that places heavy emphasis on mathematical or logical formalization of key theoretical concepts and theories, could be described as a formal science. This latter conception of formal science is much more liberal than the former, and would include all of physics, much of chemistry, and some parts of biology, ecology, psychology and economics, as well as newer computationoriented disciplines like artificial life and artificial intelligence that do not fit easily within the traditional classification of the sciences.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,045

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Structure and domain-independence in the formal sciences.James Franklin - 1999 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 30:721-723.
The formal sciences discover the philosophers' stone.James Franklin - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (4):513-533.
Applications of Formal Philosophy: The Road Less Travelled.Gillman Payette & Rafał Urbaniak (eds.) - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-22

Downloads
9 (#1,271,099)

6 months
9 (#436,446)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references