The ontological foundation of Russell's theory of modality

Erkenntnis 32 (3):383 - 418 (1990)
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Prominent thinkers such as Kripke and Rescher hold that Russell has no modal logic, even that Russell was indisposed toward modal logic. In Part I, I show that Russell had a modal logic which he repeatedly described and that Russell repeatedly endorsed Leibniz's multiplicity of possible worlds. In Part II, I describe Russell's theory as having three ontological levels. In Part III, I describe six Parmenidean theories of being Russell held, including: literal in 1903; universal in 1912; timeless in 1914; transcendental in 1918–1948. The transcendental theory underlies the primary level of Russell's modal logic. In Part IV, I examine Rescher's view that Russell and modal logic did not mix.



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References found in this work

Symposium: Is Existence a Predicate?W. Kneale & G. E. Moore - 1936 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 15 (1):154-188.
Russell's Robust Sense of Reality.Jan Dejnozka - 1988 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 32 (1):155-164.
Russell's Robust Sense of Reality.Jan Dejnozka - 1988 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 32 (1):155-164.

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