Abstract

The paper critically examines some theses from A.V. Smirnov’s monograph ‘The Logic of Meaning as a Philosophy of Consciousness: An Invitation to Reflection’. In particular, the statement about the inability of cognitive sciences to exhaustively explain conscious­ness because of its de-subjectivation within their framework. It is shown that cognitive sciences are generally able to cope with the intellectual and controlling aspects of con­sciousness. Only its phenomenal aspect remains in question, but this is clearly not what the author of the monograph means. Further, he argues that understanding the workings of consciousness underlies the philosophical foundations of any subject. The analysis shows that if we exclude consciousness as control and the phenomenal consciousness, which are obviously irrelevant here, then the philosophical foundations of anything within this understanding are reduced either to normative requirements in the form of the logical foundations of theories, or to empirical data in the form of cognitive limita­tions of real subjects. Attributing rationalism and universalism to the Western philosophy as its essential properties, the author of the monograph does not take into account that ra­tionalism as anti-empiricism has long been a kind of abandoned trend, and rationalism as a commitment to inferential procedures has also been recently challenged by some strong alternatives. Similarly, the author’s opinion of the Western philosophy of mind as the exe­cution of the Cartesian program, which he reduces to cogito ergo sum, is disputed. This methodological tool – and the metaphysical principle as well – of Descartes is subjected to incessant attacks from representatives of various schools of Western philosophy. More­over, it underlies not the philosophy of mind, but the epistemology of the great philoso­pher. Finally, the author’s concept of ‘unfolding the folded’ comes down to a kind of di­alectical deduction of the empirical features of various cultures from a priori predeter­mined ‘subject-predicate gluings’ and ‘intuitions of integrity’, which paradoxically brings us back to Hegelian-type rationalism.