Abstract

This dissertation is a systematic and fairly comprehensive assessment of the way in which philosophers have traditionally approached the issue of whether determinism is compatible with the sort of freedom that allows for ascriptions of moral responsibility. After providing a brief historical overview of a line of argument regarding the compatibility of free-will and determinism that runs from Hobbes through Hume, Mill, Moore, Schlick, Ayer, and numerous others, I draw out the methodological assumptions implicit in that line of argument: The free-will/determinism debate is a debate regarding the logical compatibility of determinism and the claim that at least some actions are free in a sense that allows for ascriptions of moral responsibility. Logical compatibility or incompatibility should be decided by considering the meanings of the terms and phrases involved in the claims and applying principles of reason. The meanings of terms and phrases such as "free", "acting freely", "could have done otherwise", etc. are to be ascertained by philosophical reflection and conceptual analysis. There is a single, shared conception of the sort of human freedom required for ascriptions of moral responsibility such that a single analysis can be given for the meaning of the relevant terms and phrases. I then note that although the line of argument running from Hobbes to Ayer is a compatibilist line, these tenets are implicit in the approach adopted by nearly all incompatibilists as well. Thus, T1-T4 represent the traditional approach to the free-will/determinism debate. ;I endorse and defend T1, T2, and T3; I reject T4. In the course of defending T1, T2, and T3, I reject P. F. Strawson's naturalism and his perspectivism . I also reject the suggestion that the causal theory of reference and meaning is the correct theory for "free" and related cognates. After rejecting T4, I claim that we should not expect to garner consensus by authoring new analyses of freedom. I suggest that future efforts be directed toward considering the philosophical consequences of a persistent lack of consensus regarding the meaning of "free"