Utilitarianism and truthfulness

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):17-19 (1972)
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Abstract

D. H. Hodgson has argued that among highly knowledgeable and rational act-Utilitarians there is no non-Circular reason to be truthful or to expect truthfulness from others; wherefore these utilitarians forfeit the benefits of communication. I reply that hodgson goes wrong by tacitly assuming that his utilitarians have no premises to reason from except those that hodgson lays down in specifying the example under consideration

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David K. Lewis
PhD: Harvard University; Last affiliation: Princeton University

Citations of this work

Promises.Allen Habib - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Hybrid Nature of Promissory Obligation.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2007 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (3):203–232.
Can we rationally learn to coordinate?Sanjeev Goyal & Maarten Janssen - 1996 - Theory and Decision 40 (1):29-49.

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