Abstract

This article examines recent developments in the regulation of the medical profession in England, with particular reference to doctors working in the National Health Service (NHS). It is argued that the Health Act 1999 and associated government policies are bringing about a shift from a «light touch», self-regulatory paradigm to a government-driven, interventionist approach. It is suggested that the reason for the change is not simply a governmental concern with the quality and nature of care provided by doctors, but more significantly, a concern with the cost of that care. The article offers a critique of the new regime, drawing on the socio-legal literature on regulation. Some aspects of the reforms ignore the need to persuade doctors to comply, and may therefore result in cheating or «creative compliance»; other aspects of the reforms provide doctors with opportunities to «neutralize» their impact. It concludes with an examination of the wider significance of the change in regulatory paradigm, and of the agenda for future research in this field