Abstract

The sun is in fact the same thing as the brightest object in the sky, but it would seem that the sun and the brightest object might have been different. Socrates may now be the same thing as the seated thing (because Socrates is now seated), but it would seem that Socrates and the seated thing will later be different (once Socrates rises). Now Aristotle’s usual way of describing such situations is to say that such pairs of entities are accidentally the same or accidentally one,Aristotle writes both of sameness and of unity, and, though it is not clear that the terms can be used interchangeably, the accounts of each are too similar to ignore and so I shall move freely between the two notions. the idea being that the sun and the brightest objectIt is worth pointing out that a correlate of ‘object’ or ‘thing’ does not standardly appear in Aristotle’s Greek descriptions of such cases. Greek allows the nominalization of any adjective merely by prefixing a definite article to it. Thus Aristo ..