A physical theory of sensation

Philosophy of Science 9 (April):197-226 (1942)
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Abstract

Up to the present time the science of physics has given us no purely physical theory by which the characteristic formal properties of sensation can be derived. No explanation of the sense world purely in terms of the postulated physical world has been forthcoming, so that the psychologist has had either to ignore sensations or consider them as at least partially unaccountable additions to the entities of physics.That there is, nevertheless, a purely physical explanation of the sense world we hope the following pages will make clear. We will present a theory in which the characteristic properties of sensation are derived from postulated physical entities.

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