Against individualistic justifications of property rights

Utilitas 18 (2):154-172 (2006)
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Abstract

In this article I argue that, despite the views of such theorists as Locke, Hart and Raz, most of a person's property rights cannot be individualistically justified. Instead most property rights, if justified at all, must be justified on non-individualistic (e.g. consequentialist) grounds. This, I suggest, implies that most property rights cannot be morally fundamental ‘human rights’.

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2009-01-28

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Rowan Cruft
University of Stirling

Citations of this work

XI-Why is it Disrespectful to Violate Rights?Rowan Cruft - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (2pt2):201-224.
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Compensation and continuity.Sandy Steel - 2020 - Legal Theory 26 (3):250-279.
Why aren't duties rights&quest.Rowan Cruft - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):175-192.
Freedom to Roam.Matthias Brinkmann - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2):209-233.

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References found in this work

Are there any natural rights?H. L. A. Hart - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (2):175-191.
Original acquisition of private property.L. Wenar - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):799-820.
Projects and Property.John T. Sanders - 2002 - In David Schmidtz (ed.), Robert Nozick. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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