Utilitas 18 (2):154-172 (2006)
AbstractIn this article I argue that, despite the views of such theorists as Locke, Hart and Raz, most of a person's property rights cannot be individualistically justified. Instead most property rights, if justified at all, must be justified on non-individualistic (e.g. consequentialist) grounds. This, I suggest, implies that most property rights cannot be morally fundamental ‘human rights’.
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Could there be a right to own intellectual property?James Wilson - 2009 - Law and Philosophy 28 (4):393 - 427.
References found in this work
Projects and Property.John T. Sanders - 2002 - In David Schmidtz (ed.), Robert Nozick. Cambridge University Press.