Introspecting brain
Abstract
Suggestions and arguments put forward by the philosophers Herbert Feigl, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, and Paul Churchland are critiqued as to the feasibility of a “direct,” quasi-perceptual apprehension of neural states through neuroscience-informed introspection. The conceptual origins of this presumptuous direct introspecting are shown to be derivative from a scientifically inadequate theory of philosophical realism. Direct perception and its integral realist theory, as well as an analogical equation of perception with introspection, are focused as to their inherent intelligibility and coherence with sensory psychology. Claims of nominal intertheoretic identities are reviewed as to possible mind–brain applications. A summary elucidation of the known nature of perception and its phenomenology reveals that though there may be an initial plausibility given to a projected direct introspection of brain from a supposed equally direct perception of stimuli, once the latter is definitively rejected from considerations of psychology, so its extrapolation to nominal brain introspection must be rejected