Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether or not epistemic normativity can be naturalized in the manner W. V. Quine and others have claimed. My central thesis is that the major strategies of accounting for normativity within naturalized epistemology which have arisen out of Quine's naturalized epistemology are not successful in preserving the normative element of epistemology. The scope of this dissertation is limited to the naturalistic turn that has arisen out of Quine's essay, "Epistemology Naturalized." Three basic strategies regarding the relationship between normativity and naturalized epistemology which have arisen in the context of Quine's work will be examined. The first strategy, eliminativism, attempts to reduce normativity to descriptive terms. The second strategy, instrumentalism, tries to provide a reduced role for normativity within naturalized epistemology. The third strategy, supervenience, attempts to avoid a reduction of normativity to descriptive terms while maintaining a dependence of the normative to the descriptive. ;The first chapter deals with Quine's proposal to place epistemology under the umbrella of the sciences. In the first section, the descriptive interpretation of Quine's article, "Epistemology Naturalized," is discussed. The second section is an examination of the work of Paul and Patricia Churchland as examples of the attempt to do epistemology on a primarily descriptive basis. The second chapter deals with the attempt to provide a limited normativity by placing it within the context of instrumental rationality. Several key thinkers are examined to see if this attempt is successful. The third chapter deals with the attempt to avoid a reduction of the normative to the descriptive by means of the concept of supervenience. In the final chapter, it is argued that a modest naturalism is possible, and four criteria are proposed for such a position