Abstract

This is another addition to the already abundant literature concerning the meaning of pleasure and pain. Yet, this book manages to be highly original on material which has been debated many times. Further, Cowan has profited from the arguments preceding his. Cowan's book falls into two general parts. The first contains a serious attempt to answer questions concerning the meaning of the concepts of pleasure and pain. A certain dialectic is apparent in his argument in that his solution consists in an attempt to reconcile two contradicting positions; the "received doctrine" in which the terms 'pleasure' and 'pain' name sensations or feelings which are conceived as "mental denizens" known only to the subject, and those theories in which pleasure and pain are identifiable with some sort of objective criteria, i.e., behavior or brain patterns. Cowan concedes that each view contains a part of the truth and tries to preserve both the private character of these concepts as well as their public aspect. Secondly, Cowan undertakes a defense of hedonism against two of the most disastrous objections to it. His defense in both cases rests on his contention that the classical hedonists understood the terms 'pleasure' and 'pain' in a highly technical sense quite different from our ordinary uses of these terms. Cowan argues the original thesis that these hedonists were not defining 'good' by 'pleasure' but were taking a meta-ethical position regarding the use of evaluative terms. Cowan further argues that the psychologist B. F. Skinner is a contemporary exponent of psychological hedonism and then considers the value of psychological hedonism in the form of Skinner's thesis of "operant conditioning" as an explanation of human behavior. These positions are controversial and the reader will have to decide for himself how sound the arguments for them are but Cowan has added fresh light to this perplexing material.--E. J. C.