In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin J. Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker. Routledge. pp. 209-238 (2021)

Sam Cowling
Denison University
Lynne Baker’s case for the incompatibility of naturalism with the first-person perspective raises a range of questions about the relationship between naturalism and the various properties involved in first-person perspectives. After arguing that non-qualitative properties—most notably, haecceities like being Lynne Baker—are ineliminably tied to first-person perspectives, this paper considers whether naturalism and non-qualitative properties are, in fact, compatible. In doing so, the discussion focus on Shamik Dasupgta’s argument against individuals and, in turn, non-qualitative properties. Several strategies for undermining Dasgupta's argument are considered, drawing on de re laws and haecceitistic possibilities. Finally, an analogy is drawn between naturalism and platonism regarding mathematical entities and naturalism's parallel commitment to individuals. I conclude that naturalists are obliged to posit non-qualitative properties.
Keywords non-qualitative properties  naturalism  haecceities  thisness
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Non-Qualitative Properties.Sam Cowling - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):275-301.
Fundamental non-qualitative properties.Byron Simmons - 2021 - Synthese 198 (7):6183-6206.
Defining Qualitative Properties.Vera Hoffmann-Kolss - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):995-1010.
Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience.Alvin Plantinga - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (3):247-272.
Ethical Naturalism.James Andrew Ryan - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Miami
Why Naturalism?David Copp - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):179-200.
Normative Naturalism on Its Own Terms.Pekka Väyrynen - 2021 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 28 (3):505-530.
Thisness and Events.Joseph Diekemper - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (5):255-276.
Against Reductive Ethical Naturalism.Justin Klocksiem - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):1991-2010.
Realist Ethical Naturalism for Ethical Non-Naturalists.Ryan Stringer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):339-362.
Yes to Realism! No to Nonnaturalism! Ulysses - 2009 - Kritike 3 (1):168-177.


Added to PP index

Total views
89 ( #129,159 of 2,497,778 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #34,481 of 2,497,778 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes