Abstract

This paper discusses the history of the confusion and controversies over whether the definition of consequence presented in the 11-page Tarski consequence-definition paper is based on a monistic fixed-universe framework—like Begriffsschrift and Principia Mathematica. Monistic fixed-universe frameworks, common in pre-WWII logic, keep the range of the individual variables fixed as ‘the class of all individuals’. The contrary alternative is that the definition is predicated on a pluralistic multiple-universe framework—like the Gödel incompleteness paper. A pluralistic multiple-universe framework recognizes multiple universes of discourse serving as different ranges of the individual variables in different interpretations—as in post-WWII model theory. In the early 1960s, many logicians—mistakenly, as we show—held the ‘contrary alternative’ that Tarski had already adopted a Gödel-type, pluralistic, multiple-universe framework. We explain that Tarski had not yet shifted out of the monistic, Frege-Russell, fixed-universe paradigm. We further argue that between his Principia-influenced pre-WWII Warsaw period and his model-theoretic post-WWII Berkeley period, Tarski’s philosophy underwent many other radical changes.