Having false reasons

In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press (2013)
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Matthew McGrath
Washington University in St. Louis

Citations of this work

Attributing error without taking a stand.Caleb Perl & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1453-1471.
Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.
Truthy psychologism about evidence.Veli Mitova - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1105-1126.

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