Constitutive relevance and the personal/subpersonal distinction

Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):547-570 (2013)
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Abstract

Can facts about subpersonal states and events be constitutively relevant to personal-level phenomena? And can knowledge of these facts inform explanations of personal-level phenomena? Some philosophers, like Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell, argue for two negative answers whereby questions about persons and their behavior cannot be answered by using information from subpersonal psychology. Knowledge of subpersonal states and events cannot inform personal-level explanation such that they cast light on what constitutes persons’ behaviors. In this paper I argue against this position. After having distinguished between enabling and constitutive relevance, I defend the claim that at least some facts about subpersonal states and events are constitutively relevant to some personal-level phenomenon, and therefore can, and sometimes should, inform personal-level explanations. I draw some of the possible consequences of my claim for our understanding of personal-level behavior by focusing on the phenomenon of addiction.

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Matteo Colombo
Tilburg University

Citations of this work

Into the dark room: a predictive processing account of major depressive disorder.Regina E. Fabry - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):685-704.
Deep and beautiful. The reward prediction error hypothesis of dopamine.Matteo Colombo - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 45 (1):57-67.
The unbearable lightness of the personal, explanatory level.Heath Williams - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 (3):655-675.

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References found in this work

The content of perceptual experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosopical Quarterly 44 (175):190-205.
The Content of Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):190.
On the reality of cognitive illusions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):582-591.

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