Dispositions, Character, and the Value of Acts

In Christian Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel & William Fleeson (eds.), Character: New Perspectives in Psychology, Philosophy, and Theology. Oxford University Press. pp. 233-250 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper concerns the central virtue ethical thesis that the ethical quality of an agent's actions is a function of her dispositional character. Skeptics have rightly urged us to distinguish between an agent's particular intentions or occurrant motives and dispositional facts about her character, but they falsely contend that if we are attentive to this distinction, then we will see that the virtue ethical thesis is false. In this paper I present a new interpretation and defense of the virtue ethical thesis and show how to rebuff the skeptical attacks advanced by Thomas Hurka, Julia Markovits, and Roger Crisp. The key, I contend, is for virtue ethicists to adopt an embodied value conception of character instead of the aretaic trait conception suggested by Aristotle.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Skepticism about Character Traits.Gilbert Harman - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (2-3):235 - 242.
Character, reliability and virtue epistemology.Jason Baehr - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):193–212.
The Possibility of Virtue.Miguel Alzola - 2012 - Business Ethics Quarterly 22 (2):377-404.
Two cheers for virtue: or, might virtue be habit forming?Peter Railton - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 1:295-330.
Cultivating Virtue.Jonathan Webber - 2013 - In Havi Carel & Darian Meacham (eds.), Phenomenology and Naturalism: Examining the Relationship Between Human Experience and Nature. Cambridge University Press. pp. 239-259.
Harman Vs. Virtue Theory.Chris Tucker - 2004 - Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):137-145.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-10-13

Downloads
627 (#23,545)

6 months
53 (#71,884)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Bradford Cokelet
University of Kansas

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references