Abstract

Gregory J. Cooper’s The Science of the Struggle for Existence is an in-depth and rigorous look into what constitutes the science of ecology. He uses as his point of orientation Haeckel’s Darwinian-influenced conception of ecology as the “science of the struggle for existence.” The link this definition shares with the theoretical tradition of evolutionary biology has led to a number of significant clashes within the field of ecology itself. Cooper portrays these tensions between a strongly Darwinian-rooted conception of ecology and a non-Darwinian ecological science as foundational issues. According to some thinkers, the above definition shares a proximity with evolutionary biology that is foundationally threatening: there is “more” to the ecological story than Darwinian-influenced sciences can offer. The foundational issues at stake are summarized in the following four objections: the biotic bias objection; theory bias objection; autonomy threatened objection; and levels of organization objection. The first complaint against the idea of an ecological science under the domain of evolutionary biology lies in the argument that many of the events occurring within the ecological realm are abiotic, and have nothing to do with living organisms or their interactions. Rather, something like temperature or weather is the contributing factor. Secondly, there is the worry about attempting to define ecology by way of an already operative theory, often deduced a priori without first consulting the actual empirical realm. Thirdly, we come to the threat that ecology could become a “sub-discipline of a sub-discipline” of evolutionary biology, hence losing any possible autonomous status. Lastly, one is warned that the Darwinian influence on the Haeckel definition severely limits or overrides the possibility of alternative ecological practices which might not find their root in the Darwinian conceptual apparatus. Chapter 2 then engages a historical review of several ecological debates. Put summarily, while many of the actual ecological practices are indeed inspired by Darwin’s evolutionary theory, we already see, in the works of Andrewartha and Birch for instance, a move away from such evolutionary concepts as competition. And as Cooper importantly suggests, there is indeed a struggle for existence, but not one that is necessarily tied down to the meaning Darwin gives to it. Hence the varying theoretical traditions that see nature as exemplifying this struggle, but on different “terms.” In our opinion, of important interest to Cooper is the nature of theories and model building, and the potential problems which might involve them.