Instrumental Evaluation in Scientific Knowledge

PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986 (1):217-226 (1986)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Unlike some recent authors, Hilary Putnam recognizes that we can not avoid inquiring about the normative force of the principles that guide scientific reasoning. His answer is in terms of values. In presenting his case for “Internal Realism”, he argues that values are presupposed in statements of fact (1981, pp. 128-134). The central thesis in his argument is that truth is not a correspondence with an “unconceptualized reality” and that “the claim that science seeks to discover the truth can mean no more than that science seeks to construct a world picture which, in the ideal limit, satisfies certain criteria of rational acceptability” (p. 130). We adopt these criteria because having a theory which conforms to them is valuable to us; it is part of human flourishing (pp. 133-134).

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,098

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Internal Realism, Truth and Understanding.Gordon Steinhoff - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:352 - 363.
Instrumental Evaluation in Scientific Knowledge.F. John Clendinnen - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:219 - 226.
Putnam on the Fact-Value Dichotomy.Lars Bergström - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):117-129.
Getting to the Truth through Conceptual Revolutions.Kevin T. Kelly & Clark Glymour - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:89 - 96.
Modest Realism.William Newton-Smith - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:179 - 189.
Is Scientific Realism a Contingent Thesis?Michael Bradie - 1972 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972:367 - 373.
Hilary Putnam had a great fall.Hannah Clark-Younger - 2009 - Emergent Australasian Philosophers 2 (1):1-13.
Truth and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge.Mary Hesse - 1976 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976:261 - 280.
Scientific Realism, Perceptual Beliefs, and Justification.Richard Otte - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:393 - 404.
The Role of Skill in Experimentation: Reading Ludwik Fleck's Study of the Wasserman Reaction as an Example of Ian Hacking's Experimental Realism.David Stump - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:302 - 308.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-07-30

Downloads
5 (#1,562,871)

6 months
3 (#1,046,015)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Induction as vindication.Wilfrid Sellars - 1964 - Philosophy of Science 31 (3):197-231.

Add more references