AbstractSense-data, if they exist, could conceivably provide foundations for empirical knowledge. Those who are opposed to empirical foundationalism are therefore also prone to reject sense-data and arguments for their existence, e.g., Rorty, Bonjour; while foundationalists are prone to accept the existence of sense-data, e.g., Russell, Ayer, Broad, Price, Lewis. An exception to this is the position of Roderick Chisholm who accepts empirical foundationalism but rejects the existence of sense-data.
Similar books and articles
The common‐sense view of physical objects.Timothy L. S. Sprigge - 1966 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 9 (1-4):339-373.
Identification and description in Ayer's sense-datum theory.David O'Connor - 1980 - Modern Schoolman 57 (March):213-242.
Sense data.Benson Mates - 1967 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 10 (1-4):225 – 244.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads