Abstract

This note is prompted by a re-reading of the late Professor J. L. Austin's British Academy Lecture of 1956 “Ifs and Cans” and Professor P. H. Nowell-Smith's rejoinder to it. Austin states his topic at the beginning, and though he re-formulates it more precisely later on, it will suffice for my purposes to quote the opening short paragraph. He asks: “Are cans constitutionally iffy? Whenever, that is, we say that we can do something, or could do something, or could have done something, is there an if in the offing—suppressed, it may be, but due nevertheless to appear when we set out our sentence in full or when we give an explanation of its meaning?”. Towards the end of his lecture he states his conclusion concerning the issue, viz. determinism, which is usually prominent at least implicitly in our discussion of such questions, in the following terms: “Determinism, whatever it may be, may yet be the case, but at least it appears not consistent with what we ordinarily say and presumably think.”.