Abstract

"Whether there is a utilitarian philosopher Quine?" Is quite subject to discussion topics. This article examines Quine for induction, as well as induction and nature of the relationship between type of claim, and compare Quine, Pei Wales and Hacker claims for related topics. Purpose is to Pei Wales and Huck as the representative of the naturalistic tradition of pragmatism and future view Quine's position. This made ​​the comparison shows that although Quine's ideas and Pei Wales and Huck's ideas are quite similar place, but there are important not compatible with the Department, this shows that we can not be embedded in Quine's no distorted From Wales to PEI tradition of Huck's naturalism. The question of whether WV Quine is a pragmatist is one that has attracted much discussion. This paper examines Quine's reconstruction of and solution to the traditional problem of induction and his view of the role of the notion of natural kinds in his solution, and then compares his views with those of Charles Peirce and Susan Haack about the problem of induction and related issues. The main purpose is to connect Quine to the philosophical tradition of pragmatism and naturalism, of which Peirce and Haack are representatives. However, this comparison shows that despite many similarities, some important disagreements between Quine, on the one hand, and Peirce and Haack, on the other hand, prevent Quine's views from being smoothly integrated into the realist framework that Peirce builds for understanding and answering the problem of induction and related issues