Skepticism and Citizenship in Modern Political Thought
Dissertation, University of Minnesota (
1992)
Copy
BIBTEX
Abstract
That political debate in liberal societies has, in recent decades, become increasingly ideological has been observed by many of those who participate in these debates. Communitarians, civic republicans, feminists, Marxists, post-modernists, and even some who call themselves "liberals" have challenged and sought to propose alternatives to the traditional principles of liberalism. ;One voice missing from this critical chorus is the skeptic's. My dissertation attempts to call attention to this omission, both historically and in a contemporary context. Historically, skepticism has been most influential in times of political turmoil and ideological fragmentation. In chapter one I briefly review the history of skeptical thought, from ancient times to the present. In chapters two through four, I focus more closely on the works of three authors whose use of skeptical and/or relativist argument has important political implications. ;Hobbes used skeptical reasoning to support an authoritarian regime. In Hume's political theory, by contrast, skepticism informs the outlook of republican citizens, who are expected to participate more actively in political life. Winch's moral philosophy, finally, is widely understood to be a defense of a kind of liberal pluralism. I argue that, in the case of each of these theorists, the capacity for self-critical thought is an essential component of responsible citizenship, and that skepticism contributes to the education of self-critical citizens. Skepticism is neither liberal, nor republican, nor authoritarian. It is, I suggest, a self-critical outlook compatible with a number of ideological viewpoints. ;In chapter five I attempt to demonstrate the relevance of this self-critical outlook for democratic citizenship. Contemporary theories of citizenship tend to emphasize either the citizen's attachment to particular groups and social movements, or the citizen's capacity for detached civic judgment. Skepticism, I argue, is a way to get politically involved citizens to see the need for detached civic judgment. By calling attention to the fallibility and one-sidedness of political judgment, skepticism is able to engage activists on the left and on the right; in this way it contributes to the education of democratic citizens generally