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What licenses the use of a definite description? The formal and philosophical literature has approached this question in two ways. The uniqueness approach (Frege, 1892; Russell, 1905; Strawson, 1950) holds that we may use a definite determiner only if the property denoted by its complement holds of exactly one individual in some domain: Sentence (1) and (2) can only be true if there is exactly one king of France, and exactly one American governor, respectively. Since this is not the case in the actual world, the sentences are either false or (on most modern accounts) fall prey to a presupposition failure.
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References found in this work BETA
The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases.Irene Heim - 1982 - Dissertation, UMass Amherst
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Citations of this work BETA
Ten Men and Women Got Married Today: Noun Coordination and the Intersective Theory of Conjunction.Lucas Champollion - 2016 - Journal of Semantics 33 (3):561–622.
Split-Scope Definites: Relative Superlatives and Haddock Descriptions.Dylan Bumford - 2017 - Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (6):549-593.
Inverse Linking, Possessive Weak Definites and Haddock Descriptions: A Unified Dependent Type Account.Justyna Grudzińska & Marek Zawadowski - 2019 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 28 (2):239-260.
Proceedings of Sinn Und Bedeutung 9.Emar Maier, Corien Bary & Janneke Huitink (eds.) - 2005 - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics.
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