Truth approximation via abductive belief change
Logic Journal of the IGPL 21 (6):999-1016 (2013)
Abstract
We investigate the logical and conceptual connections between abductive reasoning construed as a process of belief change, on the one hand, and truth approximation, construed as increasing (estimated) verisimilitude, on the other. We introduce the notion of â(verisimilitude-guided) abductive belief changeâ and discuss under what conditions abductively changing our theories or beliefs does lead them closer to the truth, and hence tracks truth approximation conceived as the main aim of inquiry. The consequences of our analysis for some recent discussions concerning belief revision aiming at truth approximation and inference to the best explanation are also highlighted.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1093/jigpal/jzt010
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Citations of this work
Robustness, Diversity of Evidence, and Probabilistic Independence.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2015 - In Mäki, Ruphy, Schurz & Votsis (eds.), Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Springer. pp. 305-316.
Truth approximation, belief merging, and peer disagreement.Gustavo Cevolani - 2014 - Synthese 191 (11):2383-2401.
References found in this work
Popper’s qualitative theory of verisimilitude.David Miller - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):166-177.
On Popper's definitions of verisimilitude.Pavel Tichý - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):155-160.
Survey article. Verisimilitude: the third period.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):1-29.
