Abstract

In this dissertation I delve into the question of whether it is in principle possible to give an adequate theory of utterance comprehension. This question is motivated by the fact that any adequate theory of utterance comprehension must provide an account of how all and only the relevant assumptions can be selected on an occasion and that no currently available theory provides such an account. ;As a way of approaching this problem of relevant assumption selection , I examine what I call 'Fodorian Rational Holism' , a philosophical doctrine which implies, among other things, that the problem here at issue is in principle insoluble. My examination of FRH delves into the question of what the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions might be upon which FRH is grounded. I identify 'the Picture of the Universe as a Connected Causal System' as such bundle of metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. ;It turns out, upon examination, that many of the views and assumptions implied and justified by PUCCS, among which are, most notably, FRH and the principle of isotropy, run counter to our ordinary intuition about how we make relevance judgments concerning contextual assumptions and counter to successful and well-established methodological practices that ordinary individuals and the scientific community as a whole follow, respectively, in approaching and dealing with the problem of relevant assumption selection. ;Such considerations lead us to draw a definitive conclusion: PUCCS must be rejected; accordingly, FRH, too, must be rejected. This outcome in turn leads us to the view that it is in principle possible to give an adequate theory of utterance comprehension