A consistent restriction of the principle of indifference

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):387-395 (1998)
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Abstract

I argue that a particular restricted version of the Principle of Indiference is a consistent, indispensible tool for guiding our probabilistic judgements.

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Citations of this work

Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.
Generalizing the lottery paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.
An empirical approach to symmetry and probability.Jill North - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (1):27-40.
Resurrecting logical probability.James Franklin - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (2):277-305.

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References found in this work

Reasonable degree of belief.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - forthcoming - Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

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