A Defense of the Luck Pincer: Why Luck (Still) Undermines Moral Responsibility

Journel of Information Ethic 28 (1):51-72 (2019)
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Abstract

In the paper, I defend the skeptical view that no one is ever morally responsible in the basic desert sense since luck universally undermines responsibility-level control. I begin in Section 1 by defining a number of different varieties of luck and examining their relevance to moral responsibility. I then turn, in Section 2, to outlining and defending what I consider to be the best argument for the skeptical view--the luck pincer (Levy 2011). I conclude in Section 3 by addressing Robert Hartman's (2017) numerous objections to the luck pincer. I argue that the luck pincer emerges unscathed and the pervasiveness of luck (still) undermines moral responsibility.

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Gregg D. Caruso
Corning Community College

Citations of this work

(In)compatibilism.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2023 - In Joseph Campbell, V. Alan White & Kristin M. Mickelson (eds.), Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 58-83.

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