Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):361 – 380 (2006)

Abstract
The reconstructive turn in memory theory challenges us to provide an account of successful remembering that is attentive to the ways in which we use memory, both individually and socially. I investigate conceptualizations of accuracy and integrity useful to memory theorists and argue that faithful recollection is often a complex epistemological/ethical achievement.
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DOI 10.1080/09515080600690573
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References found in this work BETA

The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Remembering.John Sutton - 2009 - In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press.

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