Abstract

Carnap and Wittgenstein were always far apart on issues of fundamental importance, even on questions where one might have supposed them to be close. Specifically, I will try to show that beneath what at first sight could appear to be a philosophical difference over a mundane question regarding the nature of the propositions of logic, in fact exemplified a chasm between Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s understanding of our relation to language and the world. After first laying out Carnap’s own understanding of his difference between himself and Wittgenstein on the nature of tautology, I explicate Wittgenstein’s rejection of what would soon become Carnap’s metalogical stance in The Logical Syntax of Language. I do this in terms of Wittgenstein’s reception of Frege, the significance for Wittgenstein of the sign/symbol distinction, and his views of ordinary language and skepticism already at work in the Tractatus. I point out a connection between Heidegger and Wittgenstein on ordinary language that distinguishes them both from the dominant traditions in analytic philosophy of language and from much contemporary post-modernist views of language. Finally I bring out what was at stake personally and culturally for Wittgenstein in his difference from Carnap on logical syntax.