Qualia ain't in the head

Noûs 40 (2):241-255 (2006)
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Abstract

Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. 1 Intentionalism comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects have the same qualia. 2

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Author Profiles

Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Michael Tye
University of Texas at Austin

References found in this work

Putnam’s paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.
Critical Notice.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.
Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.

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