Philosophical issues about colour vision

&
In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The primary issues concern whether objects have colours, and what sorts of properties the colours are. Some philosophers hold that nothing is coloured, others that colour are powers to affect perceivers, and others that colours are physical properties.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,846

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Colour names and the concepts of colours.Robert Pilat - 2002
Guest Editor’s Introduction.Ralph Schumacher - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):1-8.
Do we have to be realists about colour in order to be able to attribute colour perceptions to other persons?Ralph Schumacher - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):233 - 246.
Why don’t synaesthetic colours adapt away?Dave Ward - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (1):123-138.
Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World.Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience?1.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.
Theories of colour.David R. Hilbert - 1998 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal. Routledge.
Colour vision, philosophical issues about.Alex Byrne - manuscript

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
186 (#105,970)

6 months
15 (#166,852)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David R. Hilbert
University of Illinois, Chicago

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references