Erkenntnis 86 (6):1733-1755 (2021)

Darragh Byrne
University of Birmingham
The paper addresses a prima facie tension between two popular views about concepts. The first is the doctrine that some concepts are constitutively perceptual/experiential, so that they can be possessed only by suitably experienced subjects. This is a classic empiricist theme, but its most conspicuous recent appearance is in literature on phenomenal concepts. The second view is anti-individualism: here, the view that concept possession depends not only on a thinker’s internal states and relations to the concepts’ referents, but also on certain of her relations to sociolinguistic peers. In recent works, Derek Ball and Michael Tye have in effect argued that the doctrines are incompatible, and their conclusion is that no concepts depend on experience. In reply, Bénédicte Veillet endorses those authors’ incompatibilism, but argues that it is anti-individualism that we should reject. I develop an approach to reconciliation that is more promising than any considered by these theorists. Against Veillet, I defend a version of anti-individualism about phenomenal concepts, but against Ball and Tye, I argue that they can be possessed only by suitably experienced thinkers.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-019-00179-2
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,607
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

View all 54 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

In Defense of Phenomenal Concepts.Bénédicte Veillet - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (1):97-127.
There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
The Phenomenal Concept Strategy.Peter Carruthers & Benedicte Veillet - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10):212-236.
Do Phenomenal Concepts Misrepresent?Darragh Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):669-678.
Phenomenal Concepts: Neither Circular nor Opaque.E. Diaz-Leon - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1186-1199.
What Motivates Fregean Anti-Individualism?Johan Peter Gersel - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):153-172.
On the Deferential Use of Phenomenal Concepts.Julia Telles de Menezes - 2016 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72 (2-3):573-596.
Concepts and Abilities in Anti-Individualism.Endre Begby - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (10):555-575.
What Mary’s Aboutness Is About.Martina Fürst - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):63-74.
A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts.Martina Fürst - 2014 - In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge. pp. 112-135.


Added to PP index

Total views
19 ( #587,487 of 2,533,634 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #389,998 of 2,533,634 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes