Realistic structuralism's identity crisis: A hybrid solution

Analysis 66 (3):216–222 (2006)
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Abstract

Keränen (2001) raises an argument against realistic (ante rem) structuralism: where a mathematical structure has a non-trivial automorphism, distinct indiscernible positions within the structure cannot be shown to be non-identical using only the properties and relations of that structure. Ladyman (2005) responds by allowing our identity criterion to include 'irreflexive two-place relations'. I note that this does not solve the problem for structures with indistinguishable positions, i.e. positions that have all the same properties as each other and exactly the same relations to all objects (including themselves). I conclude that realistic structuralists must compromise and treat some structures eliminativistically.

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Tim Button
University College London

References found in this work

Philosophy of mathematics: structure and ontology.Stewart Shapiro - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The identity of indiscernibles.Max Black - 1952 - Mind 61 (242):153-164.
The Identity Problem for Realist Structuralism.J. Keranen - 2001 - Philosophia Mathematica 9 (3):308--330.
Structuralism and metaphysics.Charles Parsons - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):56--77.

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