In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 246--324 (2009)
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| Abstract |
I shall propose five theses on de re states and attitudes. To be a de re state or
attitude is to bear a peculiarly direct epistemic and representational relation to a
particular referent in perception or thought. I will not dress this bare statement here.
The fifth thesis tries to be less coarse. The first four explicate and restrict context-
bound, singular, empirical representation, which constitutes a significant and central
type of de re state or attitude.
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References found in this work BETA
Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1956 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.Bertrand Russell - 1911 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11:108--28.
Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.Bertrand Russell - 1917 - In Mysticism and Logic. London: Longmans Green. pp. 152-167.
View all 10 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.
A Puzzle About Seeing for Representationalism.James Openshaw & Assaf Weksler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2625-2646.
A Defence of Intentionalism About Demonstratives.Alex Radulescu - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 775-791.
View all 30 citations / Add more citations
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