Self-knowledge via inner observation of external objects?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):118-122 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1080/713659568

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,423

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Knowledge of content and knowledge of the world.Anthony Brueckner - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (2):327-343.
Privileged self-knowledge and externalism are compatible.Ted A. Warfield - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):232-37.
Externalism, internalism, and knowledge of content.Keith Butler - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.
Knowledge without observation.Godfrey N. A. Vesey - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (April):198-212.
First-person knowledge in phenomenology.Amie L. Thomasson - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 115-138.
Content externalism and brute logical error.John M. Collins - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):pp. 549-574.
Externalism, self-knowledge, and inner observation.Harold Langsam - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):42-61.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
117 (#149,742)

6 months
3 (#1,002,413)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Other bodies.Tyler Burge - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Add more references