Abstract

I investigate two kinds of reconstruction of Kant's anti-skeptical strategy in the Critique of Pure Reason. On both strategies, an attempt is made to refute Cartesian skepticism about knowledge of physical objects in space by way of arguing from a premise about self-consciousness which the skeptic would accept. I do not assess the strategies on their accuracy of interpretation of Kant, although I do use Kantian texts to set up the problem of the dissertation in chapter I. Rather, I determine whether either strategy provides us with a method for refuting Cartesian skepticism which satisfies two constraining principles: The method must not depend upon a kind of phenomenalism; The method must not depend upon a kind of verificationism. The motivation behind these constraining principles is threefold. First, neither of the views to be avoided seems plausible; second, despite the fact that there are verificationistic and phenomenalistic tendencies in the Critique, Kant does strongly suggest a third way of refuting skepticism; third, phenomenalism and verificationism each appear to afford us a direct answer to skepticism . Thus, if a Kantian anti-skeptical strategy presupposed either view, this would render superfluous any additional content it might have. A successful Kantian anti-skeptical strategy, then, would show that the falsity of Cartesian skepticism is a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness and would accomplish this task without violating either of the constraining principles. ;The first anti-skeptical strategy I investigate is that of P.F. Strawson and Richard Rorty. On this strategy, self-consciousness is in practice construed narrowly as the ability to self-ascribe a current experience. It turns out that this strategy is concerned with showing that a subject of experience, who is self-conscious in the narrow sense, must possess the concept of a physical object. I argue that the Strawson-Rorty strategy can refute Cartesian skepticism only by violating the constraining principle concerning verificationism. ;The second Kantian anti-skeptical strategy I investigate is suggested by the work of Arthur Melnick and Paul Guyer. These philosophers proceed from a premise about self-consciousness widely construed, on which one highlights a subject's knowledge about temporally diverse experiences. Guyer focusses upon the conditions for the possibility of self-ascription of a multitude of temporally diverse experiences. Melnick focusses upon the conditions for the possibility of knowledge of the temporal ordering of a series of one's experiences. I argue that neither of these variants of the second strategy can show that the existence of physical objects is a condition of the required kind. In particular, I argue that in each case the necessary premise about self-consciousness is true only on the assumption of some kind of verificationism, and even if such an assumption is made, it is far from clear how to go about drawing the desired anti-skeptical conclusion. ;My conclusions are: Both of the reconstructions I investigate fail to provide a successful Kantian anti-skeptical strategy and In the light of my results, it seems that what is required in order to carry out the Kantian project is the demonstration of two quite unpromising theses: A wide construal of self-consciousness must be accepted even by a Cartesian skeptic and The existence of physical objects is a condition for the possibility of there being a temporal ordering of one's experiences, rather than a condition for the possibility of one's coming to know facts about this ordering.