Abstract

Computational psychiatry is a quickly evolving discipline that aims to understand psychopathology in terms of computational, hence algorithmic processes. While cognitive phenomena, especially beliefs or ways of “reasoning”, can more easily be formalized, meaning re-described in mathematical terms and then entered computational models, there is speculation as to whether phenomenology might be formalizable too. In other words, there are speculations in terms of what aspects of the human experience, rather than specific cognitive processes alone, can enter computational models. Here, we explore the possibility of formalizing and modeling a phenomenological account of schizophrenia, using the concepts of “minimal self” and “intentionality”. To test the applicability of these concepts for formalization and modeling, we first aim to clarify some misunderstandings around the very nature of minimal self and intentionality, namely: whether these concepts entail a “minimal” sense of self, or might be better described in “transparent” sensory-integration and information processing terms. We then try to apply the concepts to a computational logic based on Marr’s levels of description, a fundamental account for understanding the rationale of computational psychiatry. Overall, we are asking via what conditions phenomenology can enter a computational logic.