Abstract

The only way of moving towards consensus on the controversial subject of the nature of Nibb?na is by appealing to the sole source of authority common to practically all Buddhists: the Nik?yas/?gamas. In the present paper I will first give an overview of the usage of the term Nibb?na in the Nik?yas. I will then argue that, according to the Nik?yas, Nibb?na cannot be regarded as a self. Next, I will point out that the Nik?yas do not see Nibb?na as a form of consciousness, including such exceptional kinds of consciousness as anidassana viññ??a and appati??hita viññ??a. Nor can Nibb?na be regarded as equivalent to mind, or any particular state of mind. In the final section I aim to show that the most reasonable interpretation of the Nik?yas is that final Nibb?na is no more than the cessation of the five khandhas.