El fenomenalismo analítico de A. J. Ayer

Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 13 (2016)
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Abstract

RESUMENLa segunda etapa del pensamiento filosófico de Ayer es conocida como «fenomenalismo analítico» y se caracteriza por su afirmación: lo que conoce el sujeto no son más datos sensoriales. Esto conlleva la necesidad de de crear lo que se conoce como el lenguaje de «los datos sensoriales», que debería ser previo al lenguaje ordinario y al que podría traducirse el primero mediante la provisión de una serie de reglas con este objeto. Los problemas y las críticas, conectados con la caracterización de que sea un «dato sensorial» surgieron muy pronto y tales problemas provocaron que el propio Ayer fuese obligado a redefinir su posición filosófica.PALABRAS CLAVE:DATO SENSORIAL, FENOMENALISMO ANALÍTICO, ENTIDAD CUASIFÍSICA, ENTIDAD LINGÜÍSTICAABSTRACTThe second phase of Ayer’s philosophical thought is known as «analytical phenomenalism» and is characterized by his assertion: what the subject knows is not but sense data. This involved the need of creating what is known as the language of «sense data», which should be prior to the ordinary language, and into which the last one could be translated, by means of providing a series of rules on this purpose. Problems and criticism, linked to the characterization of what a «sense datum» could be, arose very soon, and such problems and criticism forced Ayer to redefine his philosophical position.KEY WORDS.SENSE DATUM, ANALYTICAL PHENOMENALISM, QUASI-PHYSICAL ENTITY, LINGUISTIC ENTITY

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