Abstract

This thesis focuses on the relationship between pragmatic philosophy and the theory of planning. It argues that pragmatism, as developed by Peirce, Dewey, and others, provides a sound and sympathetic conceptual framework for the practice of societal planning. The argument is developed in two ways--by tracing and assessing the historical influence of pragmatism on planning, and by articulating a conceptual argument that examines substantive issues in the urban and regional planning theory literature and relates these to pragmatic concepts. ;The thesis is divided into four parts. The first part provides a review of planning theory by examining the nature of planning, the relation of planning to science, the controversy over plans versus process, the controversy over the Rational Model of the planning process, and the philosophical assumptions of planning. ;The second part provides an exposition of key pragmatic concepts. After an examination of the historical-conceptual context of pragmatism's development, key notions of pragmatism are addressed: pragmatism's central focus, the relation of thought to action, its theory of meaning, theory of knowledge, concept of science, theories of human nature and social change, theory of value, and its self-understanding. ;The third part traces the historical influence of the pragmatic movement on planning in the United States by examining the shared connection with the Reform Movement, and pragmatism's influence on the experimental planning program at the University of Chicago, as well as its direct influence on prominent figures in planning theory. It also examines and responds to the perception of pragmatism by leading planning theorists including Mumford and Friedmann. ;The fourth part of the essay concentrates on showing how pragmatic philosophy can provide fresh insights into current problems in planning theory. Pragmatism's concepts of meaning and abductive inference are developed and applied to the controversy over intractable planning problems, thus formulating a view of planning as meaning interpretation. The final chapter addresses the plurality of definitions of planning and the Rational Model and its many criticisms. It argues that many of these criticisms are tangential to the Model and that alternatives can be accommodated within a multi-faceted, integrated theory of planning