Abstract

This study attempts to uncover the conceptual unity in Bertrand Russell's normative ethic. The study traces that unity to the influence of Spinoza's central ethical concept, the "intellectual love of God", and then evaluates the ethic, which I call one of "impersonal self-enlargement". The evaluation is based on five criteria supplied by Russell himself when he considers the normative ethics of Aristotle, Santayana and Spinoza, and nine additional criteria. ;The Introduction sketches the metaethical background to Russell's ethic. Its analysis poses difficulties not encountered with most ethical theories, since Russell does not hold ethical knowledge to be possible and never systematically sets out his normative ethic. At the same time, one of his most cherished endeavours is "to find some philosophy which should make human life endurable" . Russell often associates Spinoza's central ethical concept with this endeavour, but no commentator has asserted more than an affinity between their ethical views. ;Part A examines Russell's writings on Spinoza from 1894 to 1964, dividing them into three periods. Besides the History of Western Philosophy chapter, there are reviews, a characterization of Spinoza's views in a novel, correspondence, and other items. There are also passages concerning Spinoza's Ethics scattered throughout Russell's ethical writings. Because of their uncollected and sometimes unpublished nature, I reproduce many of the passages. Russell is indebted to Spinoza chiefly, I argue, for his concept of the intellectual love of God. ;Part B analyzes Russell's two interpretations of the "intellectual love of God", traces the concept of impersonal self-enlargement in Russell's own ethical writings, and evaluates the ethic. Spinoza and Russell share a concept of the moral self that expands with knowledge and with generous feeling . Russell's chief interpretation of the intellectual love of God is similar to that of the idealist H. H. Joachim. I claim that early training in neo-Hegelianism left a permanent residue in Russell's ethics. ;In tracing Russell's ethical theory I identify two normative ethics. The first, expressed in "The Free Man's Worship", focuses on suppression of the self's demands. The second is the ethic of impersonal self-enlargement, which accepts the self's demands but which emphasizes the widening of interests irrespective of this or that person. The ethic is at its most Spinozistic in 1911-12, when Russell tries to fashion a personal religion at once godless but acceptable to his confidante, Lady Ottoline Morrell. The ethic of impersonal self-enlargment is the way of living recommended in such works as Principles of Social Reconstruction, The Conquest of Happiness and New Hopes for a Changing World, as well as minor ethical writings by Russell. ;In evaluating the ethic I first discuss its relation to other ethical theories, and then apply the fourteen criteria. There is initial difficulty in applying any criteria to a non-cognitivist's ethic, but many of mine would be applicable in judging an ethic based upon cognitivism in the inconclusive sense. I argue that Russell's Spinozistic ethic satisfies some, but not all, of the criteria. Russell appears to be aware of some of the problems, but his modifications result in a degree of arbitrariness in his ethic. Nevertheless, impersonal self-enlargement is a way of living that encourages generosity and rationality, thereby reducing human conflict. I suggest that, given the present perilous state of human conflict, the ethic warrants serious consideration. As by-products of this study, the concept of impersonal self-enlargement should lead to greater understanding of other value-laden areas of Russell's thought , and my set of criteria could be used to evaluate alternative normative ethics