What, If Anything, Is Wrong with Offsetting Nature?

Theoria 86 (6):749-768 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Biodiversity offsetting is an increasingly popular policy instrument used to compensate for losses in biodiversity and ecosystem services caused by development projects. Although evidence suggests that offsetting can yield significant environmental benefits, application of the policy instrument is surrounded by controversy. Among other things, critics argue that offsetting builds on normatively contentious assumptions regarding the value of nature and the fungibility of biodiversity components, such as species, habitats, ecosystems, and landscapes. A large portion of the criticism targets the allegedly illegitimate commodification of nature that the policy instrument entails. Exploring the significantly more developed normative discussion on carbon offsetting, this article identifies four arguments that plausibly could be made to support the claim that it is wrong to commodify nature in the way biodiversity offsetting schemes do: the common ownership argument, the price argument, the non‐substitutability argument, and the “crowding out” argument. Although none of the arguments definitively invalidate the use of biodiversity offsets, they provide good reasons to proceed with caution when designing and implementing them.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,098

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-10-30

Downloads
14 (#1,020,370)

6 months
3 (#1,046,015)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Karin Edvardsson Björnberg
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Varieties of Intrinsic Value.John O’Neill - 1992 - The Monist 75 (2):119-137.
Animal rights and the values of nonhuman life.Elizabeth Anderson - 2004 - In Cass R. Sunstein & Martha Craven Nussbaum (eds.), Animal rights: current debates and new directions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 277.
Philosophical problems in cost–benefit analysis.Sven Ove Hansson - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (2):163-183.
The Goodness of Means: Instrumental and Relational Values, Causation, and Environmental Policies.Patrik Baard - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (1):183-199.

View all 10 references / Add more references