Abstract

In the history of Cartesianism, the Traite de Morale by Nicolas Malebranche represents a rare attempt by a Cartesian philosopher to provide a systematic ethics. This dissertation examines Malebranche's moral philosophy in relation to its Cartesian sources and Augustinian inspiration. ;Malebranche's ethics begins with the apprehension of relations of perfection among ideas in the mind of God which constitutes Order. Virtue consists in the acquisition of a dominant, and habitual love of Order; such love is similar to the ethics of rightly ordered love in the Augustinian tradition. The same Order regulates both divine and human conduct, and Malebranche's anti-voluntarist stance is one of several significant differences from the thought of Descartes. His ethics is Cartesian primarily in its extension of the Cartesian method of doubt to the domain of moral choice. Whenever there remains doubt whether a finite good in life should be pursued, the method dictates suspending the will's consent to its pursuit, resulting in practical recommendations which favor asceticism. ;Malebranche's analysis of the will's operation in making such moral judgments about what to pursue as good is an innovation in the Cartesian account of judgment which responds to controversies which Descartes' own analysis of judgment had caused. Chapter Four, "Judgment", demonstrates that Malebranche's opening chapters to the Search After Truth were carefully composed to respond to challenges to the Cartesian account of judgment from Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Gassendi. The result is a careful account of the will's role in judgment which distinguishes its role in moral as opposed to strictly speculative judgments. It has not previously been noted by Malebranche's commentators that his account of judgment is original; most have viewed it as identical to Descartes'. ;Malebranche's account of judgment is critical to his longstanding opposition to Jansenism, and, later, Quietism. Chapter Five, "Grace", examines his account of grace for a fuller understanding of his moral views. Malebranche agrees with the hedonistic psychology of his Jansenist opponents, but despite his own egoism, his ethics does give priority to the demands of moral Order in the pursuit of one's own happiness