La logica di Leibniz, i possibili e l’infinito

Annali Del Dipartimento di Filosofia 8:21-51 (2002)
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Abstract

The first part of this paper is devoted to an account of some points of Leibniz’s theory of Logic. In the second part, we will discuss Leibniz’s claim that the origin of the difference between necessary and contingent truths is to be found in the distinction between finite and infinite proofs. We will give an interpretation of that claim

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