The generalized homogeneity assumption and the Condorcet jury theorem

Theory and Decision 77 (2):237-241 (2014)
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Abstract

The Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) is based on the assumption of homogeneous voters who imperfectly know the correct policy. We reassess the validity of the CJT when voters are homogeneous and each knows the correct decision with an average probability of more than a half

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