Rahner's Philosophy: A lonerganian critique
Abstract
In this article I have highlighted what I take to be some salient deficiencies in Rahner's basic philosophical position, and I have argued that Lonergan does provide arguments which can be validated on the basis of the data of self-consciousness. Rahner's metaphysics of knowing often appears as a catena of simple assertions derived, it is claimed, from St Thomas' philosophy. There are occasional attempts to justify positions taken against the possible objections of contemporary philosophy but these attempts are sporadic at best. It is Lonergan, rather than Rahner, I contend who is able to deploy St Thomas' insights in a fruitful way in the domain of contemporary thought, and that is due to the expeditious method he adopts. Characterizing an essential aspect of that retrieval of the tradition so as to be at the level of our own philosophical times, Lonergan writes: «The fact is that my aim is vetera novis augere et perficere. Nor is my procedure haphazard. Basically it is a matter of deriving basic terms and relations from the data of consciousness, of accepting traditional metaphysics in the sense that it is isomorphic with these basic terms and relations, and of rejecting traditional metaphysics in any sense that is not the to-be-known of human cognitional activity»