Argumentu 8:42-52 (2012)

Abstract
The present paper focuses on the Austinian approach to intentionality. My aim is to demonstrate that the Austinian concept and its application in the classical version of speech act theory are fundamentally different from the treatment of intentionality in the received version of speech act theory (as developed by Searle). The received version of speech act theory treats intentional states as a bunch of internal individual beliefs, desires, and intentions, while it assumes that conventions belong to the external social domains. Contrary to that, the Austinian version of speech act theory doesn’t make a sharp ideological distinction between intentional states and conventions as a result of Austin’s natural realism.
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References found in this work BETA

Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. AUSTIN - 1962 - Oxford University Press.
Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts.John Rogers Searle - 1979 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

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